Recently the Toronto Star ran a piece essentially advocating that the Ontario Government ought to change the law which provides for justices of the peace to be indemnified for the costs associated with defending themselves on judicial misconduct complaints. The article displayed a total lack of knowledge on the subject matter.
In an effort to educate the Ontario public on this issue - I thought it would be fruitful to share with readers some of the decided cases involving indemnification of justices of the peace for the cost of their legal defence. The first case I will share with the readership involves one in which the subject justice of the peace received a disposition of a recommendation for removal from office. This is the most severe penalty possible. However, in Report of a Judicial Inquiry Re: His Worship Rick C. Romain His Honour Judge Otter ordered indemnification of the justices of the peace's legal costs for his defence. It should be noted that in ordering for full indemnification the learned judge notes correctly that, "costs are not contingent on success".
In an effort to educate the Ontario public on this issue - I thought it would be fruitful to share with readers some of the decided cases involving indemnification of justices of the peace for the cost of their legal defence. The first case I will share with the readership involves one in which the subject justice of the peace received a disposition of a recommendation for removal from office. This is the most severe penalty possible. However, in Report of a Judicial Inquiry Re: His Worship Rick C. Romain His Honour Judge Otter ordered indemnification of the justices of the peace's legal costs for his defence. It should be noted that in ordering for full indemnification the learned judge notes correctly that, "costs are not contingent on success".
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF
INTRODUCTION:
On January 25th, 2002 and on September 4th, 2002 (two reports)
the Justices of the Peace Review Council recommended to the
Attorney General of Ontario that a commission of inquiry be established under
s. 12 of the Justices of the Peace Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. J. 4. as amended, to
inquire into the question of whether there had
been misconduct
by His Worship Rick Romain, a Justice of the
Peace.
On December 18th, 2002, by Order-in-Council No. 2226/2002, this commission of inquiry was appointed to determine whether
or not there has been misconduct by His
Worship Rick Romain and make recommendations regarding disciplinary action if misconduct
is found. This is the commission’s report.
BACKGROUND:
Justice
of the Peace Romain is presently 50 years of age. He was appointed a Justice of the Peace by order-in-council dated November 26th, 1987. He was initially appointed on a fee-for-service basis and
performed various duties. He became a full-time salaried
and presiding Justice
of the Peace on December
1st, 1994. He had at all times
performed a full range of functions required of a Justice of the Peace
including presiding in assignment court,
bail court, in-take
court and Provincial Offences
Act court. He presided
in the Toronto Region until December 1st, 1994. Since that time he has presided
in the Central West Region (Brampton and Mississauga).
Previously, Justice of the Peace Romain had been an Employment Standards Officer with the Ministry of
Labor, investigating complaints with respect to unlawful termination of employees.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK:
This is only the third public inquiry held pursuant to
s. 12 (1) of the Justices of the Peace
Act. The process for dealing with complaints against Justices of the Peace
is set out in the Justices of the Peace Act. Section 9 of the act establishes a Justices of the Peace Review Council [Review Council] which amongst its
other functions under Section 10(1)
(b)
is to receive and investigate complaints
against justices of the peace.
Pursuant to s. 11 (1), once the Review Council
receives a complaint against a justice of the peace, it shall take such action
to investigate the complaint including a review of it with the justice
of peace, as it considers advisable. In the course of any investigation of any complaint,
the Review Council has all the powers of a commission under Part II of the Public Inquiries Act (s.
11(5) ).
The Review Council
may, if it considers appropriate, transmit complaints to the Associate Chief Justice – Co-ordinator
Justices of the Peace (s. 11(2)). The proceedings of the Review Council
are not public but it may inform the Attorney General that it has undertaken an investigation and the Attorney
General may make that fact public (s. 11
(3)). Upon the completion of its investigation, the Review Council may report
its opinion regarding the complaint to the Attorney General and may recommend
that an inquiry be held under s. 12 (s.
11(7) (a)).
If the Review Council recommends the holding of an
inquiry, the Lieutenant Governor
in Council may appoint a provincial judge to inquire
into the question
of whether there has been a misconduct by a justice of the peace. The Public Inquiries Act applies to the
inquiry (s. 12 (2)).
Upon the completion of the inquiry and in the event
that misconduct is found, the report of the inquiry may recommend,
(a)
the Lieutenant Governor in Council remove the
justice of the peace from office in accordance with section 8 (s.12
(3)) or
(b)
implement a disposition under s. 12 (3.3).
A justice of the peace may be removed from office only
by order of the Lieutenant
Governor in Council s. 8 (1). Such an
order can only be made if:
(a)
a complaint regarding
the justice of the peace has been made to the Review Council and
(b)
the removal is recommended following an inquiry held under s. 12, on the ground that the Justice of the Peace has
become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution of his or her office by
reason of,
(i)
infirmity,
(ii)
conduct that is incompatible with the execution
of the duties of his or her office, or
(iii)
having failed to perform the duties of his or
her office as assigned. Where misconduct has been found
and the report
recommends that the Review
Council implement a disposition under s. 12 (3.3) other than removal
from office, the Review
Council may,
(a)
warn the justice of the peace;
(b)
reprimand the justice of the peace;
(c)
order the justice
of the peace to apologize to the complainant or to any other person;
(d)
order the justice of the peace to take
specified measures, such as receiving
education or treatment as a condition of continuing to sit as a justice of the peace;
(e)
suspend the justice of the peace with pay, for
any period; or
(f)
suspend the justice of the peace without pay,
but with benefits, for a period up to 30 days.
The report may recommend that the justice of the peace
be compensated for all or part of the cost of the legal services
incurred in connection with the inquiry s. 12 (3.1).
Such an award may be made whether or not there is a finding of misconduct.
This
Commission of Inquiry was directed to consider two reports. The report of January 25th, 2002 contained one complaint.
The report of September 4th, 2002 contained two complaints. Both reports emanated from
the Review Council and had been directed to the Attorney General.
There are three issues to be determined by this
commission of inquiry as set out in the Notice of Public Hearing and paragraph 9
of the Statement of Agreed Facts:
(1) Whether Justice
of the Peace Romain ordered
a law student who informed
Justice of the Peace Romain that he had no instructions to act for the defendant at trial, that he must remain for
the duration of the trial, and refused
to allow the law student to telephone
his firm for instructions or to leave the courtroom to use the washroom, in a case
involving a defendant charged with
being intoxicated in a public place.
(2) Whether Justice of the Peace
Romain made a decision to convict and imposed
sentence without hearing evidence or argument in a case in which the defendant was represented by a court agent who was asking that the case be transferred to another
court as a result of an order prohibiting the agent from appearing before the Justice of the
Peace Romain.
(3) Whether Justice of the Peace
Romain made a decision to convict and imposed
sentence without hearing
evidence or argument
because the defendant, who was charged with a traffic offence, refused to remove his
head covering on the ground that it was a religious head covering
and that an order that he remove
it would be contrary to his rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The following
bullet paragraphs are the factual outline of the three complaints as set
out in the Statement of Agreed Facts.
Issue No. 1 -
Complaint of Edward L. Greenspan, Q.C.
·
On January 31, 2000 at 424 Hensall Circle,
Mississauga, Justice of the Peace Romain presided over a pretrial motion for disclosure and a further
application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
in the matter of R. v. Lamb. Ms. Lamb was charged with being intoxicated in a public place.
The date of the alleged offence was September 22, 1998. At the conclusion of his rulings pertaining to the above
matters, Justice of the Peace Romain set a trial date of April 19, 2000,
marked peremptory to all parties
and set aside
two 90 minute blocks of time for the matter to be heard. Justice of the Peace Romain informed the parties
that he would remain seized of the matter.
·
On April 19, 2000, the scheduled trial date,
Jonathan Linden, a student-at-law in the office of Greenspan, Henein and White,
appeared before Justice of the Peace Romain, who was presiding, and indicated
that he was there as a friend of the court on behalf of Mr. Greenspan to confirm that a
notice of application for certiorari and
prohibition had been issued and filed. The notice had been filed
that same day. Justice
of the Peace Romain stated that the Notice had been filed at 10:25 a.m., five minutes before trial. The Crown stated that
she thought that about 10 police officers were present, ready for trial. Neither
Mr. Greenspan nor the defendant was present.
·
Extensive discussion ensued about whether
the trial should
proceed. Justice of the Peace Romain reviewed in detail the
circumstances surrounding the matter, as well
as the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in R. v. Batchelor (which concerns the jurisdiction to proceed in the face of an
application for prerogative relief). He decided to proceed with the trial, having regard to the facts that the matter had been marked peremptory, that considerable trial time had been set aside, that witnesses
were in attendance, that considerable time had elapsed
since the date of the alleged
offence, that the application had not been perfected in accordance with rules (indeed,
had been filed only five minutes before court) and having regard also to
the nature of the charge. He
specifically informed Mr. Linden that he might have agreed with Mr. Linden
that he had no choice but not to proceed, had the application been served in a reasonable
time. During the discussion concerning this matter, Mr. Linden advised the court that the application could not
have been perfected until that morning because his office was advised that the transcripts would only be available to be picked up the day before.
The clerk of the court then advised
the court that in fact Mr.
Greenspan’s office was informed that the transcript was ready to be picked up on April
11.
·
During
this discussion, Mr. Linden indicated that “Ms. Lamb has retained Mr. Greenspan. I have no authorization
from Mr. Greenspan as counsel of record to act for Ms. Lamb, nor is Ms Lamb here.”
·
Having
decided that the trial should proceed, Justice of the Peace Romain briefly held the
matter down to permit Mr. Linden to contact his office. In Mr. Linden’s absence, the Crown indicated to the court that “you will recall that Mr. Linden said at the beginning of the day that he was appearing as agent.” This inadvertent error was
repeated by the Justice of the Peace in his further dialogue with Mr. Linden,
once Mr. Linden returned to the courtroom.
·
Once the trial commenced, Justice of the Peace Romain
referred to Mr. Linden as agent of record. Mr. Linden attempted
to clarify that he was not agent for the defendant and that the defendant was not
attorning to the court’s jurisdiction in light of the certiorari application. Justice of the Peace Romain made a ruling
that Mr. Linden was on the record, and that he could not leave until the trial was completed.
The following exchange took place between Mr. Linden and Justice of the Peace Romain:
THE COURT: You have
come before this court and indicated that you are representing
Ms. Lamb so you are agent of record, you are not counsel
yet.
MR. LINDEN: I don’t believe that is what the
transcript reflects.
THE COURT: Well that is what it does reflect and how do you intend to plead on her behalf?
MR. LINDEN: That’s all I’m prepared to say this morning Your Worship.
THE COURT: The Court
will enter a plea of not guilty on behalf – you are not excused Mr.
Linden. You will sit at the table for these proceedings, do you understand? Thank you.
MR.
LINDEN: Your Worship. I am not here –
THE COURT: You will
sit at that
table and you
will listen to these proceedings
or I will order one of the officers
to keep you there. Do you
understand me? You have come and you have addressed this court as an agent
of the court on behalf of Mr. Greenspan [emphasis added].
MR.
LINDEN: That’s
exactly what I indicated myself as friend of the court not an
agent. I am – I am not here as an agent.
THE COURT: You put yourself on the record by arguing
what you did this
morning and therefore I am holding you to …
MR.
LINDEN: I don’t believe I have Your
Worship. I’m …
THE COURT: Well, you have.
MR. LINDEN: …. appearing as a friend of the court
and that’s it.
THE COURT: Well, I
have said you
have, so you
will be required to remain here for the proceedings.
·
Mr. Linden subsequently asked
a number of times for the court’s
permission to be excused.
Justice of the Peace Romain repeated that the court would not excuse him, and
that an order had been made which required him to remain for the trial as an agent. The following exchange took place:
MR.
LINDEN: Your
Worship, I’d like a brief indulgence so that I may call my office.
THE COURT: No, please
be seated. We
are into the
trial now. Mr. Linden you are disrupting this
court and I am getting a little discouraged by your conduct. Please be
seated.
MR.
LINDEN: Well – I’m just …
THE COURT: Please be seated.
MR. LINDEN: I’m just a friend of the Court, Your
Honour (sic). I’d like
…
THE COURT: Please be seated, I said.
MR.
LINDEN: I’d like some time to step outside.
THE COURT: No, you are not going to step outside. First witness, please.
MR. LINDEN: Just for a moment, Your
Worship.
THE COURT: No.
·
After the examination of the first witness, Justice
of the Peace Romain asked Mr.
Linden if he wanted to cross-examine the witness. Mr. Linden repeated that he was just a friend of the court, and again
asked to be excused. Justice of the Peace Romain did not excuse him.
·
Mr. Linden then asked if he could leave court to go to the bathroom. Justice
of the Peace Romain denied this request. Mr. Linden did not ask again to
leave the court for that reason.
Instead, he asked,
immediately thereafter, if he could
briefly use the phone,
which request was denied. Later on in the trial, Mr. Linden again asked if he could be excused for one minute
to call his office. He stated that he felt it was imperative to phone his office and
inform them of the status of affairs. Justice of the Peace Romain again
did not permit Mr. Linden to leave.
·
Justice of the Peace Romain did not allow Mr.
Linden to leave the courtroom until the trial was completed and his oral ruling was read.
·
Justice of the Peace Romain then imposed the set fine of $55, with no discretionary increase. He then indicated to Mr. Linden that he
appreciated the difficult situation he found himself
in, as an articling student
under instruction and that he held no ill will towards him.
·
No appeal was ultimately pursued by the defendant.
Mr. Linden testified
at this hearing that he was very upset with what transpired that day. It was an embarrassment to him. Initially when he was permitted to leave the courtroom,
he only had a brief period of time to have a conversation with somebody back in
his office. There was only one payphone at Hensall Circle and he had to wait to
use it. In his testimony,
Justice of the Peace Romain indicated that over 15 minutes had lapsed before he had Mr. Linden paged back into the courtroom.
When Mr. Linden was asked
why he just did not leave the courtroom when he recognized that Justice of the Peace Romain could
not compel him to remain in the courtroom, he testified that there were a good number of officers in the courtroom
and Justice of the Peace Romain
was clearly very angry. In his mind it was clear to him that “…if I wanted to
leave the courtroom at that time, as I believe I was entitled to do so, that I would have been detained. I believe at that point I was detained, but would have been physically detained by the officers.”
Justice of the Peace Romain testified before
the commission that his recollection at the time of the
hearing was incorrect. He erred in believing that Mr. Linden was appearing as an agent or representative of the defendant
and not as a friend of the court. He accepts that he directed Mr. Linden to
remain in the courtroom for the conduct of the trial. With the benefit of hindsight,
Justice of the Peace Romain characterizes his
thought process
at the time as well-intended but “I certainly recognize now without question that it
was inappropriate for me to require Mr. Linden to remain in the courtroom.”
Later he stated “I was wrong in doing so.” Justice of the Peace Romain acknowledges that there was emotional component
to what transpired between him and Mr. Linden that would have been upsetting
to Mr. Linden. He now agrees that he should
have permitted Mr. Linden to leave and just deal with the matter in his absence as he had no jurisdiction to require
Mr. Linden to remain in the court. Justice of the Peace Romain further accepts that
he was “…remiss in not allowing him to leave the room to use the facilities if
in fact that that is what he had to do.”
His Worship did in the course of these proceedings, in the absence
of Mr. Linden state, “I would
like to sincerely apologize to Mr. Linden for requiring him to remain in the courtroom
when there was no authority in law for me to do so. My concern
at the time was that Ms. Lamb be represented.”
Under cross-examination by commission counsel,
when asked if Mr. Linden was courteous at all times, Justice of the Peace Romain responded,
“I would say at all times
but ….” He elaborated further: “His continued disruption of the court every two
or three minutes asking to call his office. Every time there
was a pause in the proceedings, he would jump up with that and request that.”
He was doing nothing wrong
when he repeatedly denied Mr. Linden any further
opportunities to call his office.
His Worship denies that he was going through an idle
exercise when he permitted Mr. Linden to make submissions on his
application for an adjournment of the trial. In his cross-examination, he acknowledges that he considered R. v.
Batchelor (supra), the late filing of the certiorari and prohibition application, and had extended
discussions before he directed that the trial proceed. At this
time, he invited Mr. Linden to make submissions
on whether or not an adjournment should be granted. Even the Crown submitted to His Worship that the
court had no option but to not continue and release the police officers who
were present as witnesses. His Worship states “Well we are going to keep
them here because we are going to have a trial this morning.”
·
On January
12, 1999, while presiding in the Ontario
Court of Justice,
Provincial Offences Court,
at 424 Hensall Circle, Mississauga, Ontario, Justice of the Peace Romain
made an order barring a traffic court agent, the complainant Joe Alessandro, “from appearing in this court
in the future.”
·
Mr. Alessandro brought an application in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice for:
“(A) an Order in the nature [of] Certiorari, to review the Order of Romain dated January
12, 1999 barring Alessandro from the Court;
and
(B) an Order in the nature of prohibition, prohibiting Romain from presiding
at any proceeding or matter in which Alessandro appears
as an Agent for an accused and requiring Romain
to transfer any such matters
to another Court presided over by
another Justice of the Peace in the same Court
House on the same day, or if same failing, to adjourn
such proceeding or matter to another date to be heard by another Justice of the Peace.”
·
On March 13th, 2000 the application was heard by the
Honourable Mr. Justice Pitt.
·
On April 20th, 2000 Justice Pitt released an endorsement. Justice Pitt upheld Justice of the Peace Romain’s
order barring Mr. Alessandro “from appearing in this court in the
future”, but directed that the order be limited to appearances before Justice
of the Peace Romain and “that no other Justice of the Peace or Judge is
required to observe the alleged “bar.” ‘
·
Justice Pitt added as follows:
“Since the applicant
does not wish to appear before the respondent in the future, their respective wishes can be accommodated without
impairing the effective functioning
of the judicial system…. Hopefully, in due course
both parties will recognize the need to work together in the proper
Administration of Justice.”
·
On April 26th, 2000 counsel
for Mr. Alessandro and counsel
for Justice of the Peace Romain
jointly wrote to Justice Pitt to seek clarification of the effect of his
endorsement.
·
On May 2, 2000 Justice Pitt wrote to both counsel in response to their joint request.
Justice Pitt wrote, in part, as follows:
“Pursuant to my decision, His Worship Rick Romain may exercise his
right not to hear Mr. Alessandro. Since
Mr. Alessandro does not wish to be heard by His
Worship, it seems to me that their respective wishes can be easily accommodated. If His Worship has a change of heart and is prepared to hear Mr.
Alessandro, then he will hear Mr. Alessandro. I find that His
Worship did not have the right to and
did not ban Mr. Alessandro from appearing in any court before any other Justice of the Peace or Judge.
Accordingly, if His Worship does not wish in the future to hear Mr. Alessandro,
His Worship will have no option but to transmit the case to another Justice of
the Peace or Judge, as the case may be.
Accordingly, the
certiorari application is moot and the prohibition application is dismissed.”
·
On Wednesday, July 4, 2001, Justice of the Peace
Romain was presiding in the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial
Offences Court at 424 Hensall Circle, Mississauga, Ontario.
·
The complainant Joe Alessandro, a traffic court
agent, appeared before Justice of the Peace Romain on behalf of his client, Paulo
Tamburro, who was charged with speeding
under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act. Mr. Tamburro
was not in attendance.
·
Mr. Alessandro said as follows:
“Good morning, Your Worship, it’s Alessandro, initial
J.: I appear as agent
on behalf of the defendant, who is not before the Court. I don’t know if Your Worship
wants to deal with this matter or traverse it to another courtroom.”
·
Justice of the Peace Romain responded as follows:
“Well, you are not entitled
to appear before
me, so you should not be in this courtroom.
I do not want you in the courtroom. That is a ruling I made, it was upheld
by a higher court and you are banned from appearing before
me, so I would ask that you leave the courtroom, please.”
·
Mr. Alessandro asked whether the matter was
being traversed to another courtroom.
·
Justice of the Peace Romain responded as followed:
“You can’t speak to the matter, so I’m not entertaining anything
from you at this point. You are not entitled to enter a courtroom that I am sitting in … I would ask that
you leave. I’m not entertaining any submissions or any discussions with you this morning.”
· Mr. Alessandro
asked, “Couldn’t I just make one submission?” Justice of the Peace Romain
said “No.”
· Mr. Alessandro
then left the court. Justice of the Peace Romain
then stated as follows:
“We will deal with this matter. There is no one
appearing for Mr. Tamburro and Mr. Tamburro is not appearing. Mr.
Alessandro was quite well aware that he is not entitled to appear
before me. That ruling was upheld by the Superior
Court on appeal by Mr.
Alessandro and he should not have appeared in this court this morning. He is not
a competent agent and has been using tactics that are unacceptable.
It has been well documented. So this defendant is failing to appear ; he is deemed not to dispute ; $98.75; five in court costs; $103.75.
Deemed not to dispute
at 11:11 in the morning.”
·
Mr. Alessandro appealed the conviction on
behalf of Mr. Tamburro. The matter was
resolved before the appeal was argued.
An issue arises as to what conversation, if any, might have taken place between
Mr. Alessandro and the clerk of the court prior to court convening. Mr. Alessandro could not recall if he had inquired who the justice of the peace may have been that day in the courtroom.
He further testified that the clerk
did not advise
him that Mr. Tamburro’s
matter was going to be traversed to another courtroom. The evidence of Justice of the Peace Romain is that his clerk had advised
him that Mr. Alessandro was in his court that day and that the clerk had advised Mr.
Alessandro that pursuant to the direction of
Justice of the Peace Romain
his matter was being traversed
to another courtroom. The clerk informed Justice of the Peace Romain that
Mr. Alessandro would not leave the courtroom and wanted to speak to the matter on the
record. The clerk was not called to
testify. As to what transpired
prior to the start of the transcript, I accept the evidence of Justice of the Peace
Romain and reject the evidence of Mr. Alessandro. Mr. Alessandro, in my view, was not a credible witness. He did
not accept that he had been judicially reprimanded in other appeal
proceeding by Justice R. Libman for misleading the court even when confronted with the transcript of
that proceeding. He was evasive and less than candid in answering questions
about why he had been barred from appearing before His Worship. The evidence
of Justice of the Peace
Romain was not challenged or disputed on this issue. Accordingly, I find that Mr. Alessandro knew that His Worship was presiding
prior to start of the transcripted proceeding and he knew that Mr. Tamburro’s
matter was going to be traversed to
another court.
The evidence of Mr. Alessandro was that he left the
courtroom and went to an adjacent courtroom. When he discovered his
client’s case had not been transferred there, he went to the front counter where he was
informed that his client had been convicted and fined. Justice of the Peace Romain indicated
that he believed that Mr. Alessandro had left the building. He deemed his client not
to dispute the matter and made the finding of
guilt and imposed a fine. On cross-examination, Justice of the Peace Romain acknowledged
that he did not actually see Mr. Alessandro leave the building.
Justice of the Peace Romain
acknowledged that he had not seen a copy of Justice Pitt’s order nor the later letter
of clarification. He had been advised of the contents
of both by a solicitor from the Attorney General’s office.
Justice of the Peace Romain now agrees that he should
have just traversed the matter to another courtroom
and that would
have been a reasonable interpretation of the order and letter of Mr. Justice Pitt. Furthermore, he accepts that the party directly affected
by his decision was Mr. Tamburro
who was not present that day and would be totally unaware of what was transpiring in the courtroom.
Justice of the Peace Romain apologized at this inquiry
to Mr. Tamburro but admits that he had not made any effort to apologize to him earlier.
He took some comfort knowing the matter had been resolved prior
to appeal.
On March 21, 2002 Justice
of the Peace Romain was presiding in the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial Offences Court at 424 Hensall
Circle, Mississauga, Ontario.
·
Mr. Michael Ross was a defendant who appeared
before Justice of the Peace Romain on that date on a charge of failing to stop
at a red light under Section 144 (18) of the Highway Traffic Act.
·
Mr. Ross’ matter was transferred to the courtroom
in which Justice
of the Peace Romain was presiding from a courtroom
in which Justice
of the Peace Sclisizzi was presiding. The reason the case was transferred to Justice of the Peace Romain’s
courtroom is that he offered to assist because his list was completed while
Justice of the Peace Sclisizzi still
had other matters on her list to be dealt with.
·
When Mr. Ross’ case was called
(and before the recording device
was turned on) Justice
of the Peace Romain asked Mr. Ross to “remove [his] hat.”
·
Mr. Ross is an adherent
of the Rastafari religion, which is a sect of Christianity that adheres
to the ancient tradition of Moses. Rastafarians believe that those who honour God should let their locks of hair
grow and not cut them and that except when praying (and even when sleeping) they should cover their locks
because they represent
the glory of God.
·
When Justice
of the Peace Romain asked
Mr. Ross to remove his hat, Mr. Ross
responded by saying “this is not a hat, it is a religious covering.”
·
Justice of the Peace Romain again asked Mr.
Ross to remove his hat.
·
Mr. Ross again explained that the covering on
his head was a religious covering and (as the recording device was turned on)
invoked the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
·
Justice
of the Peace Romain said: “No, that is not a religious, that is a hat, sir, please take
it off.”
·
Mr.
Ross said: “No, it’s a religious covering, Your Honour (sic).”
·
Mr. Ross again invoked the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and said that what he was
wearing on his head was a religious covering.
·
After the provincial prosecutor told Justice
of the Peace Romain that she was ready
for trial, and asked Mr. Ross to come forward, Justice of the Peace Romain
stated as follows:
“I am not going to deal with the matter given this defendant’s
refusal to take that off. In my view that is a hat; it is not a
religious covering that I have seen before and the defendant is refusing to remove
it. Are you refusing that, sir?”
·
Mr.
Ross said: “I invoke my Charter of
Rights, sir.”
·
Justice of the Peace Romain stated as follows:
“No, no, I am just asking if you are refusing
to remove it, sir.”
·
Mr.
Ross said: “I invoke my Charter of Rights, sir.”
·
Justice of the Peace Romain, without hearing evidence, then
said as follows: “Thank you. Finding
of guilt; conviction; $155. Thank you.”
·
Mr.
Ross then said: “Can I have this Judge’s name or this Justice of the Peace?”
·
Justice of the Peace
Romain responded as follows: “You can get that at the front, sir.”
·
Kim Ennis,
the court reporter
who was on duty in Justice of the Peace Romain’s
courtroom on March 21, 2002, and Charlene Perrotta, the provincial prosecutor who was on duty on that date, testified at the hearing
before the Justices
of the Peace Review Council
that resulted in the report
dated September 4, 2002. On consent, a copy of the transcripts of Ms. Ennis’
evidence and a copy of the transcript of Ms. Perrotta’s
evidence are reproduced under Tabs 12 and 13 respectively in the Book of Agreed Documents, Exhibit Number 2 in
this inquiry.
·
On
March 27, 2002 Mr. Ross wrote to inquire about the identity of the Justice of the Peace who was presiding
in the courtroom in question
on March 21, 2002, as he did not
at that time have Justice of the Peace Romain’s name.
·
On April 19, 2002 Carol E. Jadis, Regional
Senior Justice of the Peace for the Central West Administration Region wrote to Mr. Ross to inform him that the Justice of the Peace
whom Mr. Ross appeared before was His Worship R. Romain. Regional Senior Justice of the Peace Jadis also provided Mr. Ross with the address
of the Justices of the Peace Review Council, which she identified as the body responsible
for dealing with any disciplinary matters involving Justices of the Peace.
Mr. Ross disagrees
with the Agreed Statement of Facts and the filed transcripts.
In his view, the facts are incomplete, inaccurate and fabricated. He testified that on his arrival in the courtroom,
no one was there. Similarly no one was there when he left the courtroom.
Further, he testified
that when he asked Justice
of the Peace Romain his name, he replied “I don’t have to
tell you that.” This does not accord with the
transcripts of the evidence of
the court reporter, Kim Ennis and the provincial prosecutor, Charlene Perrotta. In my view his disagreement as to certain
factual matters is inconsequential to
the central
elements of his complaint.
Nor is there a shred of evidence
to support his theory that this incident
is part of a wider
conspiracy by unnamed
members of the judicial
system to persecute and harass him. I accept the facts as outlined in the Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit # 1)
and the certified transcripts to be an accurate account of what transpired in Justice of the Peace Romain’s courtroom
on March 21st, 2002.
Prior to his cross-examination of Mr. Ross, Mr.
Sandler, counsel for Justice of the Peace Romain asserted,
“that it is agreed on behalf of Justice of the Peace Romain that you (Mr. Ross) should have been asked by him what the basis of your religious belief was. You should have been permitted to keep your
hat on, and that the case should have been heard with evidence.” This is buttressed by the testimony
of Justice of the Peace Romain accepting
that he should have inquired as to Mr. Ross’ religious adherence
and should have permitted him to
continue to wear the hat. His thinking at the time was that Mr. Ross was
refusing to abide by the court’s direction and this left him with no alternative but to deem the charge not to be disputed. He did not consider a contempt citation as it was a too serious power to
invoke in the circumstances.
Mr. Ross did appear with his son before Justice of the
Peace Romain in December of 2002 on a motion to reopen a matter in a case involving
his son. At that time on the evidence of both Mr. Ross and Justice of the Peace Romain, Mr. Ross and his son were
each wearing religious headgear. This
was not an issue whatsoever at that time.
Michael Ross brought an application for standing
before this commission with the attendant right to call evidence, examine
and cross-examine witnesses and make submissions on evidence relevant to his
interest. As one of the complainants, he clearly had a substantial and direct interest
in the subject-matter of this inquiry. He was not represented
by counsel. Pursuant to s. 5(1) of Public
Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. p. 41, he was granted standing.
Since the launching of these complaints and after the
hearings before the Review Council,
Justice of the Peace Romain
has taken several
positive steps to educate and rehabilitate
himself. He obtained a lengthy document entitled “Guidelines & Procedures for the Accommodation of
Religious Requirements, Practices and Observances” (Exhibit
# 5) produced by the Toronto District School Board. The
document addresses a multitude of religious faiths and
affiliations and goes on to outline basic tenets of each of those religions. Details
of the Rastafarian faith and head coverings are outlined and explained.
Justice of the Peace Romain participated in a learning
session with The Honourable Mr. Justice Fred Kaufman, a former Judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal, and an experienced presiding
officer in professional discipline cases, arbitration and mediation to address issues
raised by the complaints. Exhibit
#6 is a report from Mr.
Justice Kaufman indicating that he and Justice of the Peace Romain had a lengthy meeting to discuss judicial conduct in general and the incidents
that brought him before this commission of inquiry in particular.
Mr. Justice Kaufman and Justice of the Peace Romain discussed and analyzed a series of analogous courtroom
scenarios. Justice of the Peace Romain agreed with the
principle that the best judicial strategy consistent with judicial independence and maintaining decorum and control
of the courtroom would be, wherever possible, to hear a trial of a case
on its merits. Mr. Justice Kaufman concluded by characterizing the session as very good and led him “to believe that Justice of the Peace Romain is sincere in his desire to benefit
from advice which others can offer and learn
better ways of dealing with difficult situations.”
Justice of the Peace Romain
also met with retired Justice
of the Peace Arthur Downes
for three separate
sessions of approximately 2.5 hours duration
each, which focused
primarily on race relations and dealing with individuals of different religious backgrounds.
Lastly, he had thorough discussions about the issues
that were the subject matter of these complaints with his counsel Mr.
Mark Sandler which included better communication skills
and how he could improve on handling such difficult situations.
At the conclusion of his testimony, Justice of the Peace Romain
reiterated his apologies to
Mr. Linden, Mr. Tamburro and Mr. Ross.
Fourteen letters of commendation were filed on behalf of Justice of the Peace Romain. (Tab 14 of Exhibit # 2). Three
of these letters
had more than one signatory. Four letters were from fellow
justices of the peace. Several letters were from court staff, including court reporters, court monitors, provincial
prosecutors and court administration as well as court agents who have appeared before His Worship.
Collectively they attest to
his constructive assistance to colleagues, his professionalism, fairness and
courtesy to court agents, provincial prosecutors, court staff and defendants
appearing in his court.
Analysis of the Facts
Neither counsel seriously challenge that all three issues
outlined in paragraphs 9(i) to 9(iii) inclusive of the Statement of Agreed Facts should
be answered in the affirmative. A full analysis of those facts
together with the oral testimony of all witnesses and the filed exhibits supports
that conclusion. I conclude that each question
should be answered affirmatively.
The rehabilitative steps
and educative measures
taken by Justice
of the Peace Romain, with the advice of his counsel, in my view have had a beneficial effect on him. His careful and thorough review
of the Toronto District School
Board guidelines, his meetings and discussions with Mr. Justice Kaufman,
Justice of the Peace Downes and his
counsel, although all undertaken very recently and just prior to the
commencement of this commission of inquiry, have been helpful to
him. I accept the submission
of both counsel that I can be reasonably satisfied that Justice of the
Peace Romain will not confine a law student,
convict a defendant when he has an issue
with the paralegal representing that defendant, or convict an individual appearing
before him without
trial because he refuses to
remove his religious headgear. But the facts and findings give rise to a troubling pattern
of conduct that warrants a deeper analysis
than just the specific response to these three complaints.
Firstly, this is not an isolated incident but three
separate incidents. Arguably, the Ross complaint is a
bifurcated one as it encompasses two incidents in one. Justice of the Peace
Romain failed to inquire as to the basis of the assertion that Mr. Ross was wearing
the headgear for religious reasons
and proceeded as a result of his failure to remove his hat to convict him without an
arraignment, a plea, the hearing of any evidence, nor submissions. This
inquiry dealt with not an isolated incident of poor judgment or misuse of judicial power but rather three
and perhaps four incidents.
Secondly, the temporal framework of
these incidents is disconcerting. They occurred over a period of approximately two years: April 19th, 2000, July 4th, 2001 and on March 21st, 2002. At the time of the Alessandro complaint, Justice of the Peace Romain
was aware there had been a complaint to the Review Council about his conduct, in
the incident of April 2000. When the third incident occurred, on March 21,
2002, he already had been required
to appear before the Review Council in response to that first incident.
Thirdly, it is clear on the facts that the incidents
cannot simply be attributable to inexperience
or a lack of knowledge that might be the case of someone newly appointed
to office. Justice of the Peace Romain had been a Justice of the Peace
for 12.5 years at the time of the incident with the law student,
Jonathan Linden and over 14.5 years at the time of the incident
with Mr. Ross. He had been a full-time presiding justice of the peace since December 1st, 1994 performing a full range of judicial
functions including the conduct
of probably hundreds of trials in provincial offences court.
Fourthly, each incident
in itself is serious but even more so when all three are considered cumulatively. Underlying each
incident is a disturbing pattern of denials of
due process: the illegal detention
of a student in a courtroom, coupled with the threat to use
agents of the state, police officers, to enforce that detention; the denial of
a right to a hearing to a defendant following
a disagreement with his agent; the refusal
to allow an explanation of a religious
justification to wear a head covering in court, followed
by a denial of a hearing of the trial in response
to that assertion of religious
freedom by the defendant. Each in itself is troubling, but cumulatively
they show a course of conduct of
irrational,
arbitrary and vindictive abuses of judicial power, denying defendants fundamental fairness of judicial
process.
All three complaints would not have occurred with the
exercise of common sense and good judgment. With respect to the Linden
matter, Justice of the Peace Romain could have simply stated that the matter was
going to proceed to trial and then do so. I am taking no issue with Justice of the Peace Romain deciding to proceed with the trial. This commission of inquiry is not a court of
appellate review but only an inquiry into the conduct of the justice of the peace.
Justice of the Peace Romain misunderstood that Jonathan
Linden was appearing as a friend of the court and not an agent, a representative of the defendant. Mr. Linden’s requests to be excused or to go to
the washroom should have been accepted in the circumstances at face value. Similarly, the difficulty in the Alessandro
case could have been avoided
by traversing the matter to another court
or adjourning it to another
date. Mr. Ross’ trial could have been proceeded notwithstanding his head-covering. In these latter two cases,
no denial of the right to trial need have occurred.
In both the Alessandro complaint and the Ross complaint Justice
of the Peace Romain indicated
he was invoking the provisions of the Provincial Offences Act R.S.O.
1990, c. 33. Both charges are considered
Part I offences. They commence by way of a Certificate
of Offence. He invoked s.9.1(1) and
s.9.1(2) set out below:
Section 9.1(1) If a defendant who has given notice of an intention to appear
fails to appear at the time and place appointed for the hearing, the defendant
shall be deemed not to dispute the charge.
Section
9.1(2) If subsection (1) applies, section 54 does
not apply, and a justice shall examine the certificate of
offence and shall without a hearing enter a conviction in the defendant’s absence and
impose the set fine for the offence if the certificate is complete and regular on its face.
Both Mr. Alessandro as agent for Mr. Tamburro and Mr.
Ross representing himself were in court on trial dates seeking
an adjudication of their respective charges before an objective and impartial judicial officer. They
did not get a hearing on the merits of their cases. It is patently illogical and manifestly unfair to any reasonable litigant or
any member of the public that a trial in each case did not occur on that day. The inappropriateness
of invoking s.9.1(1) and s.9.1(2) of the Provincial
Offences Act in these circumstances
is obvious.
Justice of the Peace Romain through his counsel and in
his own testimony acknowledged that
his handling of these incidents was wrong and
inappropriate.
Fifthly, despite the rehabilitative and educative steps that Justice
of the Peace Romain has taken and the length
of time he has had to reflect
on his handling of these cases,
there remains a troubling tendency on his part to minimize and attempt to rationalize
or justify what he did. When it was put to him on cross-examination that the articling
student Jonathan Linden was courteous at all times Justice of the Peace Romain responded “I would say at all times
but …“ When asked to be specific he responded
“his continual disruption of the court every two or three minutes asking
to call his office. Every time there was a pause in the
proceedings, he would jump up with that and request that.” Later, while
agreeing that he denied Mr. Linden further
opportunities to call his office,
Justice of the Peace Romain stated as follows: “No, I don’t feel I was wrong in doing that….” It is clear on the evidence
that Jonathan Linden did nothing improper. He was courteous and
respectful throughout in seeking to obtain further instruction from his
principal despite the court’s misunderstanding that he was appearing there as a
friend of the court and not as an agent or representative of the defendant.
During cross-examination in the Alessandro matter,
Justice of the Peace Romain was asked by commission counsel if he could simply have stated that he was traversing the matter to another courtroom. He responded: … “I would
have done that had the clerk not gone out, asked him to go to the next court and his refusal. If that didn’t transpire then I would have said to him, Mr. Alessandro, I am not going to hear your matter. It’s being traversed.” But when the clerk of the court, who I have faith in and trust, comes back and tells me that he’s refusing to leave, he wants to go on the record, my view is that he wants to either
grandstand or engage me in a conversation that I don’t think should happen.”
It is noteworthy
that the apology to Mr. Alessandro arises at the absolute end of
Justice of the Peace Romain’s
testimony in chief,
despite many opportunities to do so before this Inquiry. At no time did he
apologize directly to Mr. Tamburro. He maintained that he never had an opportunity to do so.
Regarding the Linden and the Ross
complaints, when asked by commission counsel if he misused the powers of
his judicial office, Justice of the Peace Romain bluntly responded in the negative.
Finally, all these incidents occurred in public
courtroom while in session. A judicial
officer in the exercise of the powers of judicial office is always in a
position power vis-à-vis all others in
a courtroom, including law students, paralegals, unrepresented
defendants and court staff. All three complainants were justifiably upset by their
mistreatment in Justice
of the Peace Romain’s courtroom. Mr. Linden attested
to the fact that he was very
upset and embarrassed with what was transpiring in court. Mr. Alessandro indicated that he was disturbed
because his client had nothing
to do with it. Mr. Ross said “I was in shock. I was
dumbfounded.” Mr. Ross probably
sums it up best when he states “I’ve
been wrongly convicted, but I’ve never been convicted without a trial.” These
comments reflect the view of the aggrieved parties but would also likely be similar
to those of a dispassionate observer.
A characteristic of all these incidents is the obvious
display of strong emotion and lack of judgment
by Justice of the Peace Romain to what happened
in his court. He accepts that he reacted inappropriately
in each case. In each case he acted in response to circumstances that
he personally disapproved of. Might he respond with a similar emotional
reaction and lack of good judgment in the courtroom in the future?
The conviction of Ms. Lamb in respect to the complaint
from Mr. Greenspan was not pursued any further. The conviction
of Mr. Tamburro resolved prior to argument on
appeal. The role of this inquiry is not to determine whether
or not there were errors in fact or law that could be remedied on
appeal. Indeed misconduct may lead to appealable errors of law. The sole purpose of this inquiry
is to ascertain whether or not there has
been misconduct in regards to these particular complaints and if so, what disposition should follow. Mistakes can be made by
judicial officers and indeed are made, and they are not necessarily matters of discipline.
The harm to the administration of justice occasioned
by judicial misconduct may not be adequately remedied
by the appellate process.
In the Report
of a Judicial Inquiry re His Worship
Leonard R. Blackburn, a Justice of the Peace,
The Honourable Judge Mary Hogan, Commissioner
(Ontario, January 21, 1996)
noted that for a great number of citizens the human face of justice and the
judiciary are indeed the justices of the peace. Few people ever appear in the Superior Courts of Justice or the
appellate courts but many will appear in traffic court or Provincial Offences Court. Justice of the
Peace Romain attested to the large volume of
people who appear in his Provincial Offences
Court on a daily basis. Of an average of one hundred cases on a particular day,
30 to 35 of these could be contested cases.
Logically, the conduct
of the judicial officer (normally a justice of the peace)
in the Provincial Offences Court and traffic court
will be the view held by a large number of our
citizens of the judiciary in particular and judicial system in general. It is
vitally important for a justice of the peace to conduct
himself or herself in a manner that ensures the public has and retains
confidence in the administration of justice.
No submissions were made as to whether there are or
should be different standards of conduct for justices of the peace and judges. The
authorities do not address this point
with the exception of the Blackburn inquiry (supra) which found it irrelevant to the
facts of that case. The jurisprudence does not adumbrate different standards of conduct for judges of different levels of court, whether provincial or federal, trial or
appellate. Justices of the peace in Ontario are not required to be members of the provincial
bar with a minimum of ten years experience prior
to appointment. They do
receive legal training sufficient for them to discharge the duties and responsibilities of their
judicial office. Given the critically important role of justice of the peace at the gateway to our judicial
system, I am of the view that there is no reason that a justice of the
peace should not be held to the same high standard of conduct as all other
judicial officers.
While there were many authorities presented to this
commission dealing with the conduct of judges who were removed from
office for misconduct out of court, there were only two cases dealing with in-court conduct.
The first of these cases was the report of the Canadian Judicial
Council by the Inquiry Committee
appointed under subsection 63(1) of The Judges Act to conduct a
public inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Justice
Jean Bienvenue of the Superior Court of Quebec in R. v. T. Théberge. (June 1996). In this case, Justice Bienvenue’s removal from office was recommended as a result of several statements
made in the context of a single trial.
That report starts with the premise:
The security of tenure of judges is “…the first of the essential
conditions of judicial
independence…” (Valente
v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at p. 694).” This essential principle underlines the high
standard that must be addressed before there can be an order
removing a judge or other judicial officer from office.
The report goes on:
Thus, British
judges hold office during good behaviour in accordance with a custom
that dates back to 1688 and acquired force of law in 1701 with the passage of the Act of Settlement. Only one judge has been removed by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom
since 1701.
In the Bienvenue
case (supra) the test employed
by that committee of inquiry
at page 42 was:
Is the conduct alleged so manifestly and profoundly destructive of
the concept of the impartiality,
integrity and independence of the judicial role, that public confidence would be sufficiently undermined to render the judge incapable of executing the judicial office?
That hearing
committee went on to quote with approval from Professor H. Patrick Glenn’s article (page 56):
The concepts of judicial independence and ethics are interdependent. Without ethics,
there is no justification for independence. Without independence, ethics is now not enough. They are both essential and mutually reinforcing.
In applying the above standard
the majority of the committee concluded that Justice Bienvenue had breached the duty of good behaviour under s. 99 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, and had become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution
of his office.
The second case of
in-court conduct was Judge Moreau-Bérrubé (Moreau-
Bérrubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council) (2001), 209 D.L.R. (4TH) 1 (S.C.C.) where
the judge was removed from office as a result of a single incident
involving sweeping generalizations and inappropriate
statements that impugned the integrity of residents of a particular area of
the province. The decision recommending removal was ultimately upheld by
the Supreme Court of Canada.
The same test was utilized in the Moreau-Bérubé case
with a similar result. No issue was taken by counsel to this being the operative
and applicable test. I am of the view
that it would be appropriate to adopt the same criterion to this case.
In dealing with the aspect of the cumulative effect
of more than one complaint, reference was made to the Judicial Inquiry into the behaviour of
Provincial Judge Lloyd Henriksen, by the Honourable Mr. Justice
Houlden, Commissioner (Ontario, 1985). In
that inquiry, Mr. Justice Houlden agreed that it was appropriate to consider the cumulative
effect of three complaints. He quoted
from the Supreme Court of California:
The number of
wrongful acts is relevant to determining whether they were merely isolated
occurrences or, instead, part of a course of conduct establishing lack of temperament and ability to perform
judicial functions in an even-handed manner.
I am of the view that the cumulative effect of the three complaints
in this case is a significant factor to be considered.
In the Blackburn
inquiry (supra) at page 4 Judge Hogan writes:
However, justices of the peace are very important judicial officers.
Among other duties, they make decisions that affect a person’s liberty such as
bail, they determine whether process will issue, they decide whether or not
to issue search warrants, and they preside in court. In
fact, for many people their only contact with a judicial decision maker is with a
justice of the peace. It is the justices of the peace who preside in court on
matters such as parking tags, speeding tickets, by-law infractions, and provincial offences.
These are the day to day type of
“judicial” issues that confront most people. It is therefore quite probable
that a great number of the public will form judgments of our justice
system based on their experiences
with a justice of the peace.”
In dealing with the role of judicial officer from the public
perspective, Judge Hogan notes the comments of the
Honourable Mr. Justice Robins in his decision on the Commission of
Inquiry re Provincial Judge Harry Williams at page 17:
The confidence
of the public in the administration of justice is of paramount importance.
That confidence is vital to our democratic system of government. And public
confidence in the judiciary – in its integrity, its impartiality, its independence,
its moral authority – is indispensable to the administration of justice. In the ultimate analysis the
authority of our courts rests on public acceptance of judicial
decisions – and that acceptance in turn depends on public confidence in
our judges.
Every judge in
his judicial and non-judicial activity has a responsibility to preserve
and enhance public confidence in the administration of justice. He serves
as an exemplar of justice, to much of the public its personification, and confidence
in our system of justice in large measure depends on him. When he engages
in misconduct, the magnitude of the misconduct may be measured by the extent
to which he has impaired the confidence of the public in himself as a judge and
in the administration of justice.
In reviewing the three complaints before this
commission individually and cumulatively, I have no difficulty concluding that in each of the incidents Justice
of the Peace Romain’s behaviour constituted misconduct. His conduct as evidenced in these three complaints is destructive of the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judicial role and would undermine public
confidence in the administration of justice.
RECOMMENDATION
Once misconduct is found, the question of appropriate
sanction arises. The matter may be referred back to the Review Council
for implementation of a disposition under s.
12(3.3). Alternatively there can be a
recommendation for removal from office under
s.
8.1 of the Justices of the Peace Act.
Such a recommendation can only be made on the ground that the justice
of the peace has become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution of his or her office by reason of conduct
that is incompatible with the execution of his duties or his office. The grounds of
infirmity or having failed to perform the duties of his or her office as assigned,
are not applicable in this case. Has Justice of the Peace Romain
however become disabled from the due execution of his office due to his conduct?
The ultimate consequence for misconduct is a
recommendation for removal from
office. Counsel for Justice of the Peace Romain submits that such a consequence is far too severe and does not properly reflect the magnitude
of Justice of the Peace Romain’s
misconduct in this case. One of the purposes of judicial discipline is to rectify misconduct and restore public confidence in
the administration of justice. The discipline structure
set out in the Justices of the Peace Act, invites consideration of the range of
dispositions from a warning to the justice
of the peace to suspension without pay, but with
benefits, for a period up to 30 days (s.12(3.3)). In light of the
remedial and educative steps taken by Justice of the
Peace Romain, including public apologies for
his conduct and many letters of commendation his counsel has submitted that this commission should refer the matter back to
the Review Council for it to consider
administering a reprimand. This is a sanction that is more serious than a warning.
In my view,
despite the letters
of commendation and his rehabilitative steps, a reprimand does not adequately reflect the
gravity and extent of the misconduct. Given the pattern of these three complaints, over a period
of almost two years by an experienced justice of the peace, in the face of complaints pending, the individual and collective seriousness
of the incidents and a continuing reluctance
by Justice of the Peace Romain to fully accept responsibility for his
conduct, I am of the view that a reprimand is
insufficient. Justice of the Peace Romain’s misconduct evidenced by these
complaints has undermined
confidence in him in his judicial role and strongly contributed to damaging
public confidence in the judicial system. I believe that a reasonable and informed
person reviewing the subject matter of these complaints, rationally and objectively, would reasonably doubt
whether or not Justice of the Peace
Romain could execute the duties of his judicial office
with impartiality and integrity in his role as a justice of the peace.
His remedial steps are insufficient and come too late to restore public confidence in him as a judicial officer.
For the reasons given, I find that Justice of the
Peace Romain has become incapacitated or disabled from the due
execution of his office by reason of conduct that is incompatible with the execution of the duties
of his office and I recommend that he be removed
from office by order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
Costs
Pursuant to s.12(3.1) of the Justices of the Peace Act, I recommend that Justice of the Peace Rick Romain be compensated for all of his legal costs incurred
in connection with this
inquiry. By proceeding with a statement of agreed facts, these proceedings were considerably shortened. His actions
in apologizing publicly and taking remedial steps are to
be commended. Costs in the proceeding are not contingent on success. For these reasons,
I make the above recommendation regarding costs.
Dated at Toronto
this 17th day
of July 2003.
Russell J. Otter Commissioner
No comments:
Post a Comment