SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support
Program), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513, 2006 SCC
14
|
Date: 20060421
Docket: 30615
|
Between:
Robert Tranchemontagne and Norman Werbeski
Appellants
and
Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program of the
Ministry of Community, Family and Children’s Services
Respondent
and
Canadian Human Rights Commission,
Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Advocacy Centre for
Tenants Ontario, African
Canadian Legal Clinic, Empowerment
Council — Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health, and Social Benefits Tribunal
Interveners
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 54)
Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 55 to 98)
|
Bastarache J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie and Fish JJ. concurring)
Abella J. (LeBel and Deschamps JJ. concurring)
|
______________________________
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario
(Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513, 2006 SCC 14
Robert Tranchemontagne
and Norman Werbeski Appellants
v.
Director of the Ontario Disability
Support Program of the
Ministry
of Community, Family and Children’s Services Respondent
and
Canadian Human Rights Commission,
Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Advocacy Centre for
Tenants Ontario, African
Canadian Legal Clinic, Empowerment
Council — Centre for
Addiction
and Mental Health, and Social Benefits Tribunal Interveners
Indexed
as: Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support
Program)
Neutral citation: 2006
SCC 14.
File No.: 30615.
2005: December 12; 2006: April 21.
Present: McLachlin C.J.
and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal
for ontario
Administrative
law — Boards and tribunals — Jurisdiction — Human
rights issues — Legislation prohibiting Social Benefits Tribunal from
considering constitutional validity of laws and regulations — Whether
tribunal has jurisdiction to consider human rights legislation in rendering its
decisions — If so, whether tribunal should decline to exercise its
jurisdiction in instant cases in favour of more appropriate
forum — Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,
s. 47(2) — Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997,
S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. B, s. 5(2) — Ontario Works
Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. A, s. 67(2).
T and W applied for support pursuant
to the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997 (“ODSPA”). The Director of the program denied their
applications and an internal review confirmed the Director’s decisions. The Social Benefits Tribunal (“SBT”)
dismissed T’s and W’s appeals pursuant to s. 5(2) of the ODSPA based on
its finding that they both suffered from alcoholism. In so concluding, the SBT found that it did
not have jurisdiction to consider whether s. 5(2) was inapplicable by
virtue of the Ontario Human Rights Code.
The Divisional Court upheld the decision. On a further appeal, the Court of Appeal
found that the SBT had the power to declare a provision of the ODSPA
inapplicable on the basis that the provision was discriminatory, but that it
should have declined to exercise that jurisdiction in favour of a more
appropriate forum.
Held (LeBel, Deschamps and Abella JJ.
dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. The case is remitted to the SBT for a ruling
on the applicability of s. 5(2) of the ODSPA.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Bastarache and
Fish JJ.: The SBT had jurisdiction to consider the Human
Rights Code in determining whether T and W were eligible for support
pursuant to the ODSPA. Statutory
tribunals empowered to decide questions of law are presumed to have the power
to look beyond their enabling statutes in order to apply the whole law to a
matter properly before them. Here, the
ODSPA and the Ontario Works Act, 1997 (“OWA”) confirm that the SBT
can decide questions of law. As a
result, when the SBT decides whether an applicant is eligible for income
support, it is presumed to be able to consider any legal source that might
influence its decision on eligibility, including the Code. [14] [40]
With respect to the Code, there is
no indication that the legislature has sought to rebut this presumption. While s. 67(2) of the OWA clearly prohibits
the SBT from considering the constitutional validity of laws and regulations,
it is equally clear that the legislature chose not to adopt the same
prohibition where the Code is concerned.
The legislature envisioned constitutional and Code‑related issues as
being in different “categories of questions of law”. It is one thing to preclude a statutory
tribunal from invalidating legislation, but it is another to preclude that body
from applying legislation enacted by the provincial legislature in order to
resolve apparent conflicts between statutes.
Two elements of the Code’s scheme confirm this legislative intention to
differentiate the Code from the Constitution and to confer on the SBT the
jurisdiction to apply the Code. First,
the Code has primacy over other legislative enactments, and the legislature has
given itself clear directions as to how this primacy can be eliminated in
particular circumstances (s. 47(2)).
Since, in the cases of the ODSPA and the OWA, the legislature did not
follow the procedure it declared mandatory for overruling the primacy of the
Code, it would be contrary to the legislature’s intention to demand that the
SBT ignore the Code. Second, in light of
recent amendments that have removed exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation
and application of the Code from the Ontario Human Rights Commission and as a
result of which the Commission may decline jurisdiction where an issue would
best be adjudicated pursuant to another Act, it would not be appropriate to
seek to restore the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction. [31‑42]
Since the SBT has not been granted
the authority to decline jurisdiction, it cannot avoid considering the issues
relating to the Code in these cases.
Moreover, although this is not determinative, the SBT is the most
appropriate forum to decide those issues.
The applicability of s. 5(2) of the ODSPA is best decided by the
SBT because the SBT is practically unavoidable for vulnerable applicants who
have been denied financial assistance under the ODSPA. Such applicants merit
prompt, final and binding resolutions for their disputes. Where an issue is properly before a tribunal
pursuant to a statutory appeal, and especially where a vulnerable applicant is
advancing arguments in defence of his human rights, it would be rare for this
tribunal not to be the one most appropriate to hear the entire
dispute. [43‑50]
Excerpts of HW Massiah's Written Submissions
on Merits:
[1] While Justice Massiah acknowledges that he often made complementary comments to court staff, he does not accept that these comments were deliberately "sexualized" or "sexually charged", or intended to cause anyone to feel undervalued or otherwise slighted. They were intended as primarily aesthetic comments which would compliment the recipient and the overall evidence supports a finding that they were welcomed conduct in that workplace at the time they occurred.
.........Since receiving one-on-one gender sensitivity and professional boundaries education and counselling between May 28th and June 6th, 2012 he now recognizes that such comments can constitute sexual harassment and he will conduct himself differently in the future.
[14] Was the impunged conduct vexatious ?
(a) Unwelcome
The first essential element of the test is to determine whether the conduct was desired or solicited. As Professor A. P. Aggarwal in his book Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, this is essential because "sexual conduct" becomes unlawful one when it is unwelcome. Obviously, consensual relationships by by definition, cannot be regarded as harassment. In order to determine if the conduct is welcome or unwelcome, the Tribunal will look to the complainant's reaction at the time the incident occurred and assess whether she expressly, or by her behaviour, demonstrated that the conduct was unwelcome. if the evidence shows that the complainant welcomed the conduct, the complaint will fail."
CHRC v. Canadian Armed Forces 1999 Canli 18902 (FC)
[25] Respondent notes that with the exception of "leering", none of the behaviour alleged to have been committed by Justice Massiah are included in the list. No court has ever held that a series of pleasantries and compliments, accepted without comment, without more amounts to sexual harassment.
[27] The question arises whether Justice Massiah "ought to have known that the comments and behaviour were unwelcome as the statutory definition requires.
[28] As Cronk J. A. stated for the Ontario Court of Appeal:
[66] Workplaces become poisoned for the purposes of constructive dismissal only where serious wrongful behaviour is demonstrated. The Plaintiff bears the onus of establishing a claim of poisoned workplace. As the trial judge recognized, the test is an objective one. A plaintiff's subjective feelings about or even genuinely-held beliefs are insufficient to discharge this onus. There must be evidence that, to the objective reasonable bystander, would support the conclusion that a poisoned workplace environment had been created.
[67] Moreover, except for particularly egregious, stand-alone incidents, a poisoned workplace is not created, as a matter of law, unless serious wrongful behaviour sufficient to create a hostile or intollerable work environment is persistent or repeated: Bobb at para 85-87 Canadian Armed Forces re Franke at para 43-46
General Motors of Canada Limited v. Johnson 2013 ONCA 502
Excerpts of Justice Massiah's written submissions
on abuse of process:
Panel obligated
to apply the whole law:
[4] In Tranchemontangne v. Ontario [2006] 1 S.C.R. the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that 'statutory tribunals empowered to decide questions of law are presumed to have the power to look beyond their enabling statutes in order to apply the whole law to a matter properly before them.
[9] IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT, when a statutory body such as this Hearing Panel is authorized to refer to human rights principles not specifically contained in its statute (here, the JPA), it must apply the Human Rights Code (hereinafter the Code) in its entirety, including the protective provisions which require that complaints be sufficiently particularized, and in accordance with the limitation period stipulated by the Code. Anything less would be inconsistent with the quasi-constitutional status and legislative supremacy which the Ontario Legislature stipulated for the Code.
Tranchemontangne, supra
[5] Both the Human Rights Code and the procedures of the HRTO provide for strict rules with respect to particulars and a limitation period.
[6] The timeliness of a complaint concerning discrimination of any kind is always highly relevant. For that reason, both the Federal Human Rights Code(sic) and the Ontario Provincial Code(sic) include a limitation period, which can be overcome in very limited circumstances.
Human Rights Code, s.34
[7] In Ontario, the Human Rights Code has quasi-constitutional authority. Where provisions of the Code conflict with other law, it is the provisions of the Code which are to be applied.
Ontario Human Rights Code, s.47(2)
[8] As the Supreme Court of Canada has stated with reference to s.47(2):
"This primacy provision has both similarities and difference with s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which announces the supremacy of the Constitution. In terms of similarities, both provisions function to eliminate the effects of inconsistent legislation. At the end of the day, where there is a conflict with the Code or the Constitution, the ultimate effect is that the other provision is not followed and, for the purposes of that particular application, it is as if the legislation was never enacted."
Tranchemontangne v. Ontario, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at par 35
[10] Under the Ontario Human Rights Code, allegations of gender or other discrimination must be made in a timely fashion, absent a positive showing of good faith. While this hearing is being held under the Justices of the Peace Act, it is submitted that the underlying principles of human rights jurisprudence are fully applicable to this hearing otherwise HW Massiah is being denied a fundamental right to fairness.
[14] It is submitted that a Justice of the Peace accused of the violation of human rights principles is entitled to "fairness between the parties" as well. It would be erroneous to provide a sitting Justice of the Peace or Provincial Court Judge with less procedural protection than is received by a landlord or an employer subject to a human rights complaint. He or she should not have judicial security of tenure put at risk because of claims that would not pass muster under the Human Rights Code, it is submitted.
Excerpts of Presenting Counsel's
Reply submissions to these issues:
[25] There appears to be considerable overlap between this issue and the “in writing” argument.
[26] His Worship contends that the Human Rights Code is directly applicable to this proceeding and that the presumptive one-year limitation period in s. 34(1) of the Code should bar the witness’ complaints. He also appears to make the startling claim that the prohibition against sexual harassment applies only to employers like Durham Region and not to judicial officers like himself. (Tab 2, para.
Excerpts of HW Massiah's Written Submissions
on Merits:
[1] While Justice Massiah acknowledges that he often made complementary comments to court staff, he does not accept that these comments were deliberately "sexualized" or "sexually charged", or intended to cause anyone to feel undervalued or otherwise slighted. They were intended as primarily aesthetic comments which would compliment the recipient and the overall evidence supports a finding that they were welcomed conduct in that workplace at the time they occurred.
.........Since receiving one-on-one gender sensitivity and professional boundaries education and counselling between May 28th and June 6th, 2012 he now recognizes that such comments can constitute sexual harassment and he will conduct himself differently in the future.
[14] Was the impunged conduct vexatious ?
(a) Unwelcome
The first essential element of the test is to determine whether the conduct was desired or solicited. As Professor A. P. Aggarwal in his book Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, this is essential because "sexual conduct" becomes unlawful one when it is unwelcome. Obviously, consensual relationships by by definition, cannot be regarded as harassment. In order to determine if the conduct is welcome or unwelcome, the Tribunal will look to the complainant's reaction at the time the incident occurred and assess whether she expressly, or by her behaviour, demonstrated that the conduct was unwelcome. if the evidence shows that the complainant welcomed the conduct, the complaint will fail."
CHRC v. Canadian Armed Forces 1999 Canli 18902 (FC)
[25] Respondent notes that with the exception of "leering", none of the behaviour alleged to have been committed by Justice Massiah are included in the list. No court has ever held that a series of pleasantries and compliments, accepted without comment, without more amounts to sexual harassment.
[27] The question arises whether Justice Massiah "ought to have known that the comments and behaviour were unwelcome as the statutory definition requires.
[28] As Cronk J. A. stated for the Ontario Court of Appeal:
[66] Workplaces become poisoned for the purposes of constructive dismissal only where serious wrongful behaviour is demonstrated. The Plaintiff bears the onus of establishing a claim of poisoned workplace. As the trial judge recognized, the test is an objective one. A plaintiff's subjective feelings about or even genuinely-held beliefs are insufficient to discharge this onus. There must be evidence that, to the objective reasonable bystander, would support the conclusion that a poisoned workplace environment had been created.
[67] Moreover, except for particularly egregious, stand-alone incidents, a poisoned workplace is not created, as a matter of law, unless serious wrongful behaviour sufficient to create a hostile or intollerable work environment is persistent or repeated: Bobb at para 85-87 Canadian Armed Forces re Franke at para 43-46
General Motors of Canada Limited v. Johnson 2013 ONCA 502
Excerpts of Justice Massiah's written submissions
on abuse of process:
Panel obligated
to apply the whole law:
[4] In Tranchemontangne v. Ontario [2006] 1 S.C.R. the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that 'statutory tribunals empowered to decide questions of law are presumed to have the power to look beyond their enabling statutes in order to apply the whole law to a matter properly before them.
[9] IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT, when a statutory body such as this Hearing Panel is authorized to refer to human rights principles not specifically contained in its statute (here, the JPA), it must apply the Human Rights Code (hereinafter the Code) in its entirety, including the protective provisions which require that complaints be sufficiently particularized, and in accordance with the limitation period stipulated by the Code. Anything less would be inconsistent with the quasi-constitutional status and legislative supremacy which the Ontario Legislature stipulated for the Code.
Tranchemontangne, supra
[5] Both the Human Rights Code and the procedures of the HRTO provide for strict rules with respect to particulars and a limitation period.
[6] The timeliness of a complaint concerning discrimination of any kind is always highly relevant. For that reason, both the Federal Human Rights Code(sic) and the Ontario Provincial Code(sic) include a limitation period, which can be overcome in very limited circumstances.
Human Rights Code, s.34
[7] In Ontario, the Human Rights Code has quasi-constitutional authority. Where provisions of the Code conflict with other law, it is the provisions of the Code which are to be applied.
Ontario Human Rights Code, s.47(2)
[8] As the Supreme Court of Canada has stated with reference to s.47(2):
"This primacy provision has both similarities and difference with s.52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which announces the supremacy of the Constitution. In terms of similarities, both provisions function to eliminate the effects of inconsistent legislation. At the end of the day, where there is a conflict with the Code or the Constitution, the ultimate effect is that the other provision is not followed and, for the purposes of that particular application, it is as if the legislation was never enacted."
Tranchemontangne v. Ontario, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at par 35
[10] Under the Ontario Human Rights Code, allegations of gender or other discrimination must be made in a timely fashion, absent a positive showing of good faith. While this hearing is being held under the Justices of the Peace Act, it is submitted that the underlying principles of human rights jurisprudence are fully applicable to this hearing otherwise HW Massiah is being denied a fundamental right to fairness.
[14] It is submitted that a Justice of the Peace accused of the violation of human rights principles is entitled to "fairness between the parties" as well. It would be erroneous to provide a sitting Justice of the Peace or Provincial Court Judge with less procedural protection than is received by a landlord or an employer subject to a human rights complaint. He or she should not have judicial security of tenure put at risk because of claims that would not pass muster under the Human Rights Code, it is submitted.
Excerpts of Presenting Counsel's
Reply submissions to these issues:
[23] What is the nature of the
“procedural protection” His Worship is seeking by way of this argument? What
procedural unfairness has the process subjected him to? His Worship has not
said. He has offered a strained legal argument about why the complaints were invalid
but has not provided any explanation of why
his proposed interpretation actually does promote fairness. Presenting Counsel
submits that a reasonable observer would see the process followed in this case
as anything but unfair to His
Worship. He had full disclosure and an opportunity to respond in writing to the
allegations against him, and did so. He had the opportunity to hear the case
against him and testify before the Panel. He has brought a number of procedural
motions and received a full hearing each time. It is difficult to see any
procedural unfairness whatsoever in the full adversarial process His Worship
has been accorded. There is no sense in which the interpretation proposed by
His Worship would actually enhance the fairness of the proceedings; rather, it
would frustrate the goal of maintaining an accessible and responsive judicial
conduct regime.
[24] In sum, His Worship’s
interpretation of the Act is inconsistent with its clear terms as well as its
motivating purpose. This Panel has jurisdiction to hear the case – as it has
been doing for well over a year now – and should proceed to a decision on the
merits.
The
“Abuse of Process” Issue
[25] There appears to be considerable overlap between this issue and the “in writing” argument.
[26] His Worship contends that the Human Rights Code is directly applicable to this proceeding and that the presumptive one-year limitation period in s. 34(1) of the Code should bar the witness’ complaints. He also appears to make the startling claim that the prohibition against sexual harassment applies only to employers like Durham Region and not to judicial officers like himself. (Tab 2, para.
[27] There is no merit to these
submissions. The Panel is applying the Justices
of the Peace Act, not the Human
Rights Code. In any event, this same argument was raised by His Worship at
the previous hearing and rejected. The previous Panel wrote:
[211] Furthermore, concern was expressed that some
of the complaints before this Panel might have been subject to limitation
periods under the Ontario Human Rights regime.
[212] The Panel is of the view that the
aforementioned points have no particular bearing on this hearing. We agree with Presenting Counsel’s
submission that the issues herein are not being adjudicated pursuant to the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990,
Chapter H.19 (the “Code”) as amended but rather pursuant to the Justices of the Peace Act as it relates
to possible judicial misconduct. References to the Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Policy on Sexual Harassment and Inappropriate Gender Related
Comments and Conduct might very well provide assistance to the Panel when
considering what constitutes harassment and inappropriate behaviour in the
workplace but the recommendations as contained in the material are specific to
the Code itself.
[213] The Panel is aided in its deliberations by
the Code’s definition of “harassment” as found in Section 10(1)(e).
“Harassment” means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is
known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.
[214] It should also be noted that although there
is a the one-year limitation period in Section 34(1)(a) of the Ontario Human
Rights Code, a Tribunal as constituted under the Code, pursuant to Section
34(2), may proceed if it is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith
and that no substantial prejudice will result.
[215] A number of the complainants at this hearing
testified that they did not report Justice of the Peace Massiah’s actions for a
variety of reasons including: their belief that Justice of the Peace Massiah’s
conduct was treated as a joke, their newness to their workplace, they would not
be believed and the embarrassing nature of the complaint.
[216] This Panel is not governed by the
procedural directions of the Human Rights Code. However, if we were so
governed, we would have allowed the complaints to proceed in the current case.
The reasons for the delay in reporting combined with the fact that these
allegations are not particularly dated do not put Justice of the Massiah in a
prejudicial position. In fact, Justice of the Peace Massiah’s evidence
demonstrated his familiarity with the events in question.
28. It should be noted that this argument was not raised by His Worship before the Divisional Court. Therefore, the previous panel's holding is binding. Moreover, it is clearly correct in law.
28. It should be noted that this argument was not raised by His Worship before the Divisional Court. Therefore, the previous panel's holding is binding. Moreover, it is clearly correct in law.
Excerpts of Panel Decision
on Abuse of Process:
[107] Counsel for His Worship submitted that pursuant to the Tranchemontangne (see bow) decision, we have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to human rights principles and the Human Rights Code (HRC) applies to this hearing. Counsel then relied on s. 34(1) of the HRC to argue that the allegations contained in the Investigators' Report should have been reported within one year of the actual alleged events which is the time limit set out in the Code for persons to seek remedies under that Act. Mr. House submitted that this Panel should interpret the HRC so as to apply the one year restriction for new allegations to His Worship, as a member of the judiciary. He also submitted that several of the witnesses were acting in bad faith by not coming forward sooner.
[108] Presenting Counsel Henein argued that the time limits under the HRC cannot be extended to His Worship. Rather, there is no time limit for allegations of judicial misconduct under the Act.
[109] We accept, pursuant to Tranchemontangne v. Ontario Director, Disability Support Program, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 that we have concurrent jurisdiction to look beyond the Act and to consider the law on sexual harassment and sexualization in the workplace as defined under the Human Rights Code to assist us in determining whether there was judicial misconduct:
[49] The intersection of the ODSPA regime with human rights law in the present dispute only accentuates the importance of the SBT deciding the entire dispute in front of it. In Zurich Insurance Co. v. OHRC 1992 Canliii 67 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321 at p. 339, Sopinka J. described human rigths legislation as often being the "final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised" and the "last protection of the most vulnerable members of society". But this refuge can be rendered meaningless by placing barriers in front of it. Human rights remedies must be accessible to be effective.
Tranchemontangne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at para 49
[110] We also agree that we have the authority to determine questions of law, including violations of the Human Rigths Code (see Exhibit 17, Legal Opinion -- Stockwoods LLP dated May 23, 2014)
[112] A plain reading of these two sections in context shows that a person who is seeking a remedy under s.45.2 must make an application under s.34 within one year or show good faith as to why the deadline should be extended.
[113] No witness heard by this Panel is seeking any s.45.2 remedy. Therefore, on its face the s.34 time limit is not applicable, whether a witness acted in good faith or not.
[114] His Worship relied on Tranchemontangne. The case, however, is not authority for special status. His Worship's claim of special status is at odds with the concepts that the judiciary is not above the law, that a member of the judiciary is accountable to the public for his or her conduct and that a disposition should be imposed to restore public confidence if the confidence has been lost as the result of judicial misconduct. There is no basis for Justice Masiah's position on this issue.
[115] Our responsibility is not limited to considering whether actions and comments of His Worship Massiah constituted human rights violations. Nor is the remedy one that applies only to persons who were the subject of his actions. We may, as Tranchemontangne indicates, decide whether there has been human rights violations. However, our responsibility is broader. We must determine whether the alleged acts took place and whether those acts constitute judicial misconduct. If there was judicial misconduct, the remedy imposed would be intended to benefit the public at large - to preserve and restore public confidence in the judiciary in general. The Act imposes no time limitation on bringing forward an allegation of judicial misconduct and it would be inconsistent with the objective of the complaints process and the goal of human rights legislation of protecting vulnerable members of society to try to import a one-year time limit into this framework.
[116] We find there is no time limit for allegations of judicial misconduct to be filed as a complaint with the Review Council.
[119] The ability of each witness, including His Worship, to recall events and provide accurate testimony on events of years ago is an issue to be assessed when we consider and weigh the evidence on its merits. In our opinion, a passage of time that may cause memory to fade does not, however, form a basis to conclude there has been an abuse of process. No legal basis or actual prejudice on the facts of this case was presented which counters that view.
Excerpts from panel's
Reasons for Decision:
[206] His Worship's evidence that his compliments, which we accept objectified and sexually harassed women, were simply part of his "management style" demonstrated complete lack of insight or callous disregard for the women in his workplace. Given his depth of experience working in the area of human rights law, and his position as a judicial officer, His Worship would have known or ought to have known that such behaviour could cause offence, harm, discomfort and/or undermine the dignity of female staff and prosecutors.
[108] Presenting Counsel Henein argued that the time limits under the HRC cannot be extended to His Worship. Rather, there is no time limit for allegations of judicial misconduct under the Act.
[109] We accept, pursuant to Tranchemontangne v. Ontario Director, Disability Support Program, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 that we have concurrent jurisdiction to look beyond the Act and to consider the law on sexual harassment and sexualization in the workplace as defined under the Human Rights Code to assist us in determining whether there was judicial misconduct:
[49] The intersection of the ODSPA regime with human rights law in the present dispute only accentuates the importance of the SBT deciding the entire dispute in front of it. In Zurich Insurance Co. v. OHRC 1992 Canliii 67 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321 at p. 339, Sopinka J. described human rigths legislation as often being the "final refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised" and the "last protection of the most vulnerable members of society". But this refuge can be rendered meaningless by placing barriers in front of it. Human rights remedies must be accessible to be effective.
Tranchemontangne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at para 49
[110] We also agree that we have the authority to determine questions of law, including violations of the Human Rigths Code (see Exhibit 17, Legal Opinion -- Stockwoods LLP dated May 23, 2014)
[112] A plain reading of these two sections in context shows that a person who is seeking a remedy under s.45.2 must make an application under s.34 within one year or show good faith as to why the deadline should be extended.
[113] No witness heard by this Panel is seeking any s.45.2 remedy. Therefore, on its face the s.34 time limit is not applicable, whether a witness acted in good faith or not.
[114] His Worship relied on Tranchemontangne. The case, however, is not authority for special status. His Worship's claim of special status is at odds with the concepts that the judiciary is not above the law, that a member of the judiciary is accountable to the public for his or her conduct and that a disposition should be imposed to restore public confidence if the confidence has been lost as the result of judicial misconduct. There is no basis for Justice Masiah's position on this issue.
[115] Our responsibility is not limited to considering whether actions and comments of His Worship Massiah constituted human rights violations. Nor is the remedy one that applies only to persons who were the subject of his actions. We may, as Tranchemontangne indicates, decide whether there has been human rights violations. However, our responsibility is broader. We must determine whether the alleged acts took place and whether those acts constitute judicial misconduct. If there was judicial misconduct, the remedy imposed would be intended to benefit the public at large - to preserve and restore public confidence in the judiciary in general. The Act imposes no time limitation on bringing forward an allegation of judicial misconduct and it would be inconsistent with the objective of the complaints process and the goal of human rights legislation of protecting vulnerable members of society to try to import a one-year time limit into this framework.
[116] We find there is no time limit for allegations of judicial misconduct to be filed as a complaint with the Review Council.
[119] The ability of each witness, including His Worship, to recall events and provide accurate testimony on events of years ago is an issue to be assessed when we consider and weigh the evidence on its merits. In our opinion, a passage of time that may cause memory to fade does not, however, form a basis to conclude there has been an abuse of process. No legal basis or actual prejudice on the facts of this case was presented which counters that view.
Excerpts from panel's
Reasons for Decision:
[206] His Worship's evidence that his compliments, which we accept objectified and sexually harassed women, were simply part of his "management style" demonstrated complete lack of insight or callous disregard for the women in his workplace. Given his depth of experience working in the area of human rights law, and his position as a judicial officer, His Worship would have known or ought to have known that such behaviour could cause offence, harm, discomfort and/or undermine the dignity of female staff and prosecutors.
[207] We note that the Ontario Court of Justice Discrimination and Harassment Policy for Judges and Justices of the Peace was not established until 2009. However, we find that His Worship acted in a manner inconsistent with the Human Rights Code. His actions constituted sexual harassment and he failed to treat others in the justice system with mutual respect and dignity. He also acted in a manner inconsistent with the Principles of Judicial Office of Justices of the Peace of the Ontario Court of Justice that articulate the public's expectation of a high level of conduct from justices of the peace.
No comments:
Post a Comment